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Presidential Control of
Adjudication Within the
Executive Branch
Harold J. Krent†
Abstract
Commentators long have debated the scope of the Chief Executive’s
role in overseeing, enforcing, and at times reshaping the many programs
and policies enacted by Congress. The question of the President’s
authority over adjudications that Congress has entrusted to administrative agencies has been examined less frequently. The tension is
clear: on the one hand, the President should have inherent authority to
manage the adjudications that Congress has seen fit to entrust to
agencies to resolve; but on the other, political control over adjudication
seems anathema to rights of litigants asserting claims against the
government itself. Congress, therefore, may seek to curtail the executive
branch’s control of the adjudicative process to provide greater rights
for individuals and firms involved in adjudications within the executive
branch.
Accordingly, this Article first examines the scope of the President’s
Article II authority to manage adjudications within the executive
branch. The Article initially notes, as have others, that the Supreme
Court has limited the President’s removal and (to some extent)
appointment authority over officials engaged in adjudication, as opposed to other functions within the executive branch. The Article then
argues that Congress, accordingly, should also be able to delimit the
President’s general Article II managerial authority over adjudicative
officials more than those exercising enforcement and regulatory
functions. Finally, the Article considers congressional directives that
curb executive management efforts, particularly the recent Veterans
Access Act that altered the disciplinary appeal route for SES employees
in the Veterans Administration and the congressional specification in
the Administrative Procedure Act that Administrative Law Judges
(“ALJs”) enjoy decisional independence. The Article concludes that
such congressional direction, if clear, should displace the executive
interest, in the first example, of preserving the role of the Merit Systems
Protection Board in overseeing all federal employee discipline cases and,
in the second example, in removing from office ALJs whom the
employing agency believes do not competently interpret the law, apply
agency policy, or find facts.
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Introduction
Commentators long have debated the scope of the Chief Executive’s
role in overseeing, enforcing, and at times reshaping the many programs
and policies enacted by Congress. The Supreme Court has weighed in
on conflicts between Congress’s Article I powers and the Chief
Executive’s Article II authority often, most recently curbing the
President’s Recess Appointment authority.1
The question of the President’s authority over adjudications that
Congress has entrusted to administrative agencies has been examined
less frequently. The tension is clear: on the one hand, the President
should have inherent authority to manage the adjudications that
Congress has seen fit to entrust to agencies to resolve; but on the other,
political control over adjudication seems anathema to rights of litigants
asserting claims against the government itself. Congress, therefore, may
seek to curtail the executive branch’s control of the adjudicative process
to provide rights for individuals and firms involved in adjudications
within the executive branch.2
This Article first examines the scope of the President’s Article II
authority to manage adjudications within the executive branch. This
Article initially notes, as have others, that the Supreme Court has
limited the President’s removal and (to some extent) appointment
authority over officials engaged in adjudication as opposed to other
functions within the executive branch. The Article then argues that
Congress, accordingly, should be able to delimit the President’s more
1.

NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014).

2.

Theoretically, Congress could direct the President or administrative
agency to afford litigants fewer rights as well.
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general Article II managerial authority over adjudicative officials as
well. Finally, this Article considers the propriety of congressional directives that curb executive management efforts, particularly the congressional specification in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)3
that Administrative Law Judges enjoy decisional independence.

I. The Nature of Adjudication Within
the Executive Branch
Congress long has delegated extensive authority to the executive
branch to adjudicate a wide variety of claims against the government,
as reflected currently in the millions of immigration, veterans, and
Social Security Disability cases resolved each year.4 Moreover, it has
delegated authority (albeit less commonly) for agencies to adjudicate
disputes among private parties, as between labor and management
under the National Labor Relations Act,5 and formerly between
shippers and common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act.6
Adjudicatory authority is a familiar feature of agency terrain.
In placing adjudications within the executive branch, Congress
presumably intends agencies, at least at times, to exercise policymaking
through adjudication.7 As within any common law system, rules to
govern future behavior emerge through the adjudicative process.
Private individuals and firms consult the decisions to order their
behavior in the future. Congress cannot, of course, delegate traditional
private rights to the executive branch for adjudication, but it can

3.

5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).

4.

See Veterans Benefits Administration Reports, U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs, http://www.benefits.va.gov/reports/detailed_
claims_data.asp (May 2, 2015) (showing more than half a million pending
claims as of February 2015); Backlog of Pending Immigration Cases as of
March 2015, Trac Immigration http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last visited May 6,
2015) (showing more than 400,000 pending claims); Annual Statistical
Supplement, 2014, Social Security Administration, http://ssa.gov/
policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/2f4-2f6.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2015) (showing more than three million received disability insurance
claims in fiscal year 2013).

5.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).

6.

United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238–46 (1973).

7.

See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“To insist upon
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over
necessity.”); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)
(“[S]urely the Board has discretion to decide that the adjudicative
procedures in this case may also produce the relevant information
necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues.”).
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delegate a panoply of public rights for executive branch adjudication,8
whether before Article I courts or administrative agencies.
Consider litigation within the Securities and Exchange Commission. If the President could no longer appoint or remove SEC Commissioners, a court might conclude that he had insufficient influence over
elaboration of critical financial policy. Adjudication within the
executive branch involves not only factfinding but policy elaboration.
Agencies such as the NLRB make policy almost exclusively through
adjudication,9 and it was the SEC’s policymaking authority that triggered one of the Supreme Court decisions most deferential to agency
policymaking through adjudication.10 In SEC v. Chenery, the Court
upheld the agency’s authority to fashion new policy in the midst of a
utility reorganization and then to apply that policy retroactively, stressing that the agency “has drawn heavily upon its accumulated
experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed
its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as
to the underlying basis of its order.”11 Moreover, those rules can be
articulated in adjudications because “[t]here is . . . a very definite place
for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”12
Policymaking, therefore, frequently arises out of the adjudications
that Congress entrusts to the executive branch. Agencies are to interpret gaps in statutes and regulations13 and determine the broad frameworks within which facts are to be assessed. And, as the Supreme Court
famously explained in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable
to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate
for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
8.

Congress can, however, delegate private rights that have been federalized.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 594
(1985) (upholding a federal statute requiring arbitration of private
disputes arising from a government registration scheme).

9.

Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in
Pragmatism, 41 Duke L.J. 274, 274 (1991); see also Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. at 293–94 (discussing previous cases in which the NLRB set
policy through adjudication).

10.

Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202–03.

11.

Id. at 199.

12.

Id. at 203.

13.

Courts defer to statutory construction under the familiar Chevron
construct. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
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either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the
statute in light of everyday realities. 14

Absent sufficient say in development of that policy, Presidents could
no longer superintend development of the tasks delegated to the
executive branch by Congress.
Aside from policymaking through statutory interpretation or
crafting rules in adjudication, agencies also make policy less directly by
crafting presumptions arising in adjudication. The Supreme Court has
upheld the agency’s right to create such presumptions in particular
factual contexts. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,15 the question
presented was whether an employer impermissibly discharged three
employees for wearing UAW-CIO union steward buttons.16 The
employer argued that if it allowed employees to wear such buttons,
employees would think that it implicitly favored that union, and it
would thereby interfere with its employees’ choice of a representative.
The statutory touchstone was whether the employer’s conduct discriminated against the employees by discharging them because of protected
conduct. Motive is the linchpin. The Board created a presumption that
an employer’s permission for employees to wear union steward buttons,
at least where there was no competing labor organization at the plant,
did not imply recognition or support of that particular union. The
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, reasoning that, after a hearing, an
agency may “infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts
such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven.”17
Agencies can generate rebuttable presumptions based upon the
likelihood that certain facts constitute evidence of a statutory violation.
Those presumptions reflect policymaking.
Agencies not only can create presumptions, but they also can derive
inferences from sets of facts based on their particular knowledge of the
field. Even through factfinding, agencies fashion a type of subsidiary
policy. When agencies decide the weight to be accorded certain facts,
or the likelihood that particular facts will occur in tandem, they set
precedent for future decision makers. Those inferences, while not
governing private parties directly, set policy for future adjudications
and affect the rights of private parties. In Penasquitos Village, Inc. v.
NLRB,18 for example, the principal question concerned whether
companies had wrongfully terminated two employees in derogation of
14.

Id. at 865–66.

15.

324 U.S. 793 (1945).

16.

Id. at 795.

17.

Id. at 800.

18.

565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
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their statutory rights protected under the National Labor Relations
Act.19 The ALJ, after hearing all of the testimony, credited the
testimony of the employer’s supervisor that the employees were dismissed because of the slow pace of their work. The NLRB, however,
reversed the ALJ, concluding that because the supervisor knew the
employees were leaders of an organizational effort at the worksite and
had not previously warned the employees, the discharge was pretextual.
The court of appeals agreed that it was the agency’s province to derive
inferences from the facts and thereby set policy.20
Consider, as well, the more recent decision in Elliott v. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.21 There, the issue concerned whether
brokers had engaged in prearranged, and therefore illegal, trades of
commodities.22 The ALJ sided with the brokers, relying on the
testimony of the brokers and two other traders. The ALJ concluded
that the trades had not been prearranged but rather that the market
had provided only limited competition. The Commodities Future
Trading Commission reversed, relying instead on the structure and
timing of the trades. From the pattern of trading, it inferred that they
were prearranged and hence in violation of the commodities act.
On review, a divided Seventh Circuit upheld the agency. It held
that the agency acted within its expertise in overturning the ALJ’s
factfinding based on the inferences it drew from the patterns. In support, it provided an oversimplified example:
[A] police officer can testify that he was suspicious of a driver
because he thought it unusual that a car was driving slowly and
not using turn signals. The officer would be allowed to draw
inferences from these facts without presenting evidence that cars
usually drive faster on that particular street (much less evidence
of the normal speed at which they drive). The factfinder could
rely on its own experience to conclude that this sort of behavior
was out of the ordinary.23

The agency thus can use its experience to derive inferences from factual
patterns arising within its expertise and set agency policy for the future.
19.

Id. at 1076. In the particular case, however, a majority of the court
determined that the Board’s derivative inferences stemmed in part from
discredited testimony and thus concluded that the discharge of the employees should be upheld. Id. at 1083–84.

20.

Id. at 1078–79; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d
1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When, as here, the Board accepts the ALJ’s
basic factual and credibility determinations, it may draw inferences and
conclusions from them different from the ALJ’s.” (citing Int’l Union v.
NLRB, 834 F.2d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1987))).

21.

202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000).

22.

Id. at 927.

23.

Id. at 936.
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At stake, therefore, is control over administrative policy delegated
by Congress. When Congress delegates adjudications to the executive
branch, should Presidents have equal say in controlling the policy
generated through adjudication as through rulemaking and enforcement?

II. A Brief History of Adjudication Within
the Executive Branch
A turn to history does not help illuminate the question above because, for the few adjudications delegated by Congress to the executive
branch in the first years of the nation, Presidents exercised virtually
unfettered discretion in molding the adjudications. Congress delegated
adjudicative authority to the executive branch without limiting Presidential control to any extent. As a result, the policy emerging from the
delegated authority reflected that of the President, and there was no
need to accommodate a congressional interest in safeguarding adjudicative independence with the President’s interest in superintending
delegated authority.
In the Founding generation, the executive branch assessed claims
against it in a variety of ways. For instance, in the first generation,
Commissioners and others assessed claims for pensions without the
niceties of formal litigation. Executive control was plenary, and the
right of judicial review nonexistent. In the absence of direction from
Congress, the executive sought to manage the adjudication as efficiently
as possible. Executive control over adjudication was similar to that over
policymaking generally.
With respect to veterans’ claims, the first Congress provided
compensation to disabled veterans.24 The act, however, did not include
a claims resolution or adjudication mechanism. The implication was
that the executive should proceed as it deemed appropriate. In 1792,
Congress remedied that oversight in passing the Invalid Pension Act,
which assigned Article III judges the task of recommending eligibility
for pensions to the Secretary of War.25 The Supreme Court later held
that Congress could not, consistent with the dictates of an independent
judiciary under Article III, impose nonjudicial duties upon Article III
judges.26 The Court reasoned that the claims resolution process involved
nonjudicial duties because the Secretary of War enjoyed the final say

24.

An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United
States, 1 Stat. 95 (1789).

25.

An Act to Provide for the Settlement of the Claims of Widows and
Orphans Barred by the Limitations Heretofore Established and to
Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, 1 Stat. 243 (1792).

26.

Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.2 (1792).
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as to whether the pensions would be paid.27 Congress responded in 1803
by vesting the authority to decide claims directly in the Secretary of
War, thereby removing the judges from the process altogether.28 Under
the Revolutionary War Pension Act in 1818,29 all veterans could receive
benefits if they could show that they had served and were in “reduced
circumstances.”30 By that Act, disability was no longer the touchstone
for receiving benefits.31 The executive branch, therefore, fleshed out the
meaning of “reduced circumstances” in the diverse contexts in which
veterans lived.
Practice under the 1818 Act is illustrative. Claims evidently were
considered either by pension clerks working directly for the Pension
Bureau or by state judges. There were no formal hearings, and the
clerks and state judges made decisions on the papers submitted by the
veterans.32 Disappointed claimants could appeal to Congress for a
private bill of relief. When, later in the century, claimants attempted
to access the courts, the Supreme Court rebuffed the effort on the
ground that “[n]o pensioner has a vested legal right to his pension.
Pensions are the bounties of the government, which Congress has the
right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall, at its discretion.”33
Accordingly, the process accorded claimants was of no legal importance,34 and Congress vested in the executive full control over management of the process.
For another example, Jerry Mashaw related in his series on the
history of administrative law35 that Congress in 1794 appropriated
money for those who fled a Saint Domingo insurrection “in such manner, and by the hands of such persons, as shall, in the opinion of the
27.

Id.

28.

James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the
History of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 Vet. L. Rev.
135, 145 (2011).

29.

3 Stat. 410 (1818).

30.

Id.

31.

See A.F. Sisson, History of Veterans’ Pensions and Related
Benefits 12 (1946).

32.

For the controversies spawned in implementing the program, see John
Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans,
Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic
119–45 (1999) (detailing the scandals that arose when applications
increased under the 1818 Act).

33.

United States ex rel. Burnett v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1883).

34.

At times, members of Congress represented claimants, a practice that
illustrates the lack of formality. See Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History 1829–1861, at 417–18 (1954).

35.

Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256 (2006).
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President, appear most conducive to the humane purposes of this act.”36
Moreover, after the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress assigned the executive
the authority to appoint a “board of inquest” to assess damages from
the rebellion and grant compensation “to aid such of the said sufferers
as, in his opinion, stand in need of immediate assistance.”37 Congress
provided the executive no details of the mechanism to use in making
the compensation determinations.
These examples suggest that Presidents have long exercised
substantial control in shaping the claims resolution processes set into
motion by Congress. Presidents directed clerks and others to resolve
claims, and affected individuals had no recourse to the courts. In the
absence of any congressional specification, Presidents enjoyed authority
under Article II to oversee the adjudication. Individuals enjoyed no Due
Process rights to an independent judicial officer insulated from
presidential supervision.38 Congress, for the first 150 years of our
history, seldom delimited the President’s discretion in deciding claims
left to his resolution.

III. Presidential Control Through the
Appointment and Removal Authorities
In the last seventy-five years, however, Congress more frequently
has conditioned the way in which the executive branch is to carry out
delegated adjudicative tasks. The question, then, is how to accommodate such congressional direction with the Article II interest in
superintending all delegated authority.
The appointment and removal authorities represent the formal
means by which a President influences executive branch policymaking.
Although party and personal loyalty may, at times, be as effective,
there is no question but that through both means Presidents can shape
the policy formulated by subordinates, whether reached through
rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudication.
On the one hand, fundamental norms of fairness suggest the wisdom
of separating adjudication from political control. Given those norms,
perhaps Congress can insulate adjudication within the executive branch
more than rulemaking and enforcement. On the other hand, why
differentiate different types of policymaking within the executive
branch? Agency officials fashion executive policy whether acting
36.

Id. at 1298 (citing 6 Stat. 13 (1794)).

37.

Id. (citing 4 Annals of Congress 1001–02 (1794) (statements of
Representatives Gilbert and Boudinot)).

38.

See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (upholding delegation of
workmen’s compensation scheme to agency and rejecting a Due Process
attack to administrative adjudication of eligibility); Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975) (upholding against a Due Process attack adjudication carried out by state medical board that exercised both investigative
and adjudicative tasks).
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through rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudication. Accordingly, this
Article next explores whether the President’s power to appoint and
remove adjudicatory officials is as plenary as over officials exercising
regulatory and enforcement authority, before turning in Part IV to the
question whether the President’s inherent managerial power should be
as great in the adjudicatory context as it is in the others.
A. The Appointment Power

With respect to the appointment power, Presidents select judicial
officials, whether serving on the bench or in agencies, as well as
enforcement officials. Presidents gain influence over adjudication
through the power to determine the identity of the officials exercising
judicial power. Under Article II, the President must have authority to
appoint all superior officers such as Article III judges.
Congress also can vest the appointment of subordinate judicial
officials in the President but can select as well (with a qualification
discussed infra)39 the heads of departments or courts of law. Although
the President currently does not have the power to appoint all lowerlevel judicial officials, heads of departments typically appoint such
judicial officials, and thus control remains with the executive branch.
In Ryder v. United States,40 for instance, the Court invalidated
appointment of civilians on the Coast Guard Court of Military Review
on the ground that the appointment circumvented Article II and
thereby divested the President of sufficient say in elaboration of
adjudicative policy.41 More recently, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
Librarian of Congress’s appointment of members of the Copyright
Royalty Board because the Board members, as principal officers exercising judicial functions, could only be appointed by the President.42
In contrast, in Edmond v. United States,43 the Court upheld the
Secretary of Transportation’s appointment of judges on the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals on the ground that they were inferior
officers,44 and the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner45 did the same
with respect to Tax Court special trial judges.46 The extent of judicial
39.

Congress might vest appointment of inferior judicial officers in the courts
of law. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.

40.

515 U.S. 177 (1995).

41.

Id. at 182–84.

42.

Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 684
F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court’s cure was to convert the Board
members to inferior officers.

43.

520 U.S. 651 (1997).

44.

Id. at 660–61.

45.

501 U.S. 868 (1991).

46.

Id. at 873.
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duties and degree of authority exercised determine whether the judicial
officials are superior or inferior officers.47
The appointment power provides Presidents with the ability to
choose individuals whom they trust to carry out law enforcement, rulemaking and adjudication. By itself, however, the appointment power
provides Presidents with limited control given that officials and judges
may veer from the policy preferences of a President. The first President
Bush’s appointment of David Souter to the Supreme Court resulted in
a liberal voting pattern and thus provides an illustration of the
imperfect control of the appointment power.48 Nonetheless, the
appointment power is a key facet of the presidential power to carry into
effect the laws set in motion by Congress.
Congress cannot choose the officials to preside over adjudications,
other than to determine in the case of an inferior officer whether the
President or some other entity outside Congress is to appoint the
official. If the judicial officer does not rise to the level of an inferior
officer, then Congress need not place the appointment in the hands of
the President, head of a department, or the courts of law. For instance,
in Landry v. FDIC,49 the D.C. Circuit determined that an FDIC ALJ
was not an inferior officer but merely an employee, principally because
the ALJ had no formal decisionmaking authority but merely
recommended decisions to the agency for resolution.50 The ALJ’s
factfinding authority by itself was insufficient to meet the “significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” test51 to determine
officer status. Even though the FDIC often deferred to ALJ factfinding,
de facto authority could not be equated with “officer” status. And, in
Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,52 the same court held
that settlement officers at the IRS Office of Appeals were not inferior
officers, principally because their discretion was highly constrained.53
Employees typically are covered by the Civil Service laws and shielded
from at-will dismissal. In any event, Congress presumably can take no

47.

Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.

48.

See Ed Lazarus, Four Enduring Myths About Supreme Court Nominees,
Time (May 26, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/
article/0,28804,1900851_1900850_1900845,00.html.

49.

204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

50.

Id. at 1134. Similarly, in Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit held that Tax Court
appeals officers are employees within the meaning of Article II because
their discretion was highly constrained and subject to supervision. Id. at
1134.

51.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).

52.

676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

53.

Id. at 1133.
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direct role in the selection of employees who work within the executive
branch.
The Court has recognized a limited exception to presidential power
over appointments. In Morrison v. Olson,54 the Court upheld an
unusual interbranch appointment of an executive branch official.55
Under the Ethics in Government Act,56 Congress vested in a special
division of the D.C. Circuit the power to appoint an independent
counsel, whom the Court deemed to be an inferior officer within the
executive branch. Although the appointment robbed the President of
his customary power to determine the identity of officials administering
the law, the Court upheld the interbranch appointment, reasoning that
the Appointments Clause included no explicit prohibition on
interbranch appointments given that Congress under Article II can vest
the appointment of an inferior officer “in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”57 The Court
acknowledged that such appointment could violate the separation of
powers if it deprived one branch of its power to fulfill its constitutional
obligations and “would be improper if there was some ‘incongruity’
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the
performance of their duty to appoint.”58 Thus, it is likely that courts
would find appointment by the courts of law of judicial officials in the
executive branch more “congruous” than appointment by the courts of
law of enforcement officials. One can imagine, for instance, a role for
Article III judges in appointment of judicial officials working on Article
I tribunals such as the Court of Federal Claims or the Tax Court.59 Or,
Congress could empower Article III judges to appoint ALJs. To that
limited extent, therefore, Presidents have less power to appoint judicial
officials than others within the executive branch.
B.

The Removal Authority

Presidents have argued, and courts have agreed,60 that the
President’s removal authority is largely derivative of the power to
appoint. Although not explicit, Article II vests in the President the
54.

487 U.S. 654 (1988).

55.

Id. at 696–97.

56.

28 U.S.C. §§ 591–98 (1994) (no longer in effect due to nonrenewal).

57.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

58.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676; see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398
(1880) (upholding judicial appointment of election supervisors vested with
some enforcement responsibility).

59.

For a proposal that Article III judges appoint ALJs, see Kent Barnett,
Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (2013).

60.

See e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–71 (determining the removal of an
officer under the appointment power).
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power to remove from office principal (and, at times, inferior) officers
exercising law administration and rulemaking authority, such as for
heads of administrative agencies. At times, the President’s removal
authority is plenary, but the Court has also recognized that Congress
can limit the President’s control over principal officers when not
incompatible with his ability to manage the executive branch.61
Although Congress can shut down an agency, it can take no direct role
in removing any official from office other than through impeachment.62
The removal authority provides Presidents with a formal way to
ensure that subordinate officials toe the line in exercising duties
delegated by Congress, creating a type of “‘here-and-now subservience.’”63 At the same time, the removal authority links acts of subordinates to the President in the public eye.
As applied to judicial officials, the removal power ensures that the
President can discharge officials at least for “cause.” Even though the
parameters of cause have not been fleshed out by the Court, it would
plainly empower the President to remove officials who abuse the public
trust. If an Article I judge on the Tax Court were rude to litigants, the
President could remove the judge from office. The President could also
remove judicial officials who neglected their duties or engaged in
improprieties off the bench.
In Kuretski v. Commissioner,64 taxpayers sought to invalidate tax
assessments on the ground that the President’s power to remove an IRS
Commissioner for cause violated the separation of powers.65 They
argued that the potential for removal meant that Article I judges would
be too deferential to the President’s interests and thereby counter
Congress’s design of an independent Tax Court. The D.C. Circuit
rebuffed the challenge, reiterating that “Congress may afford the
[judicial] officers . . . a measure of independence from other executive
actors, but they remain Executive-Branch officers subject to
presidential removal.”66 Setting aside what constitutes “cause,” the
removal authority remains a principal means by which Presidents
superintend the authority delegated from Congress.
61.

See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675–77. Congress has the power to create
independent agencies within the executive branch, which typically refers
to the fact that Congress can shield the head of such agencies from plenary
removal. See id. at 687.

62.

See e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (“Congress cannot reserve
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of
the laws except by impeachment.”).

63.

Id. at 727 n.5 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1392
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).

64.

755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

65.

Id. at 932.

66.

Id. at 944.
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With respect to the removal power, the Court has suggested that
Presidents have less authority over judicial officials as opposed to others
within the executive branch. Most notably, the Court first suggested
limits to executive control over adjudication in Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States.67 There, the Court considered whether the President
enjoyed the plenary right of removal over the head of the Federal Trade
Commission, even though Congress had specified that the
Commissioner could only be removed for cause. The Court distinguished Myers v. United States,68 which had upheld the President’s
inherent right to remove an officer of the United States for any reason
at all,69 on the ground that the FTC Commissioner exercised both
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power.70 Of relevance here, the Court
stated that the
Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed . . . or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any
proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the
executive.71

The Court further elaborated that “[u]nder § 7, which authorizes the
commission to act as a master in chancery under rules prescribed by
the court, it acts as an agency of the judiciary.”72 Indeed, the Court
stated that a rule recognizing an executive plenary removal authority
over the FTC Commissioner would necessitate recognizing such
authority over “judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising
judicial power.”73 Given that judicial officials within the executive
branch routinely resolve cases between claimants and the government,
removing judges for being too anti-government would prevent the very
aims of establishing a formal judicial procedure. Presidents should be
able to remove such officers for cause, but not for accumulating a
claimant-friendly record.
The Supreme Court maintained the Humphrey’s Executor differentiation in Wiener v. United States.74 The Court held that the President did not enjoy plenary removal authority over a War Claims
67.

295 U.S. 602, 604 (1935).

68.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).

69.

Id. at 176.

70.

Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627–28.

71.

Id. at 628.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 629.

74.

357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
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Commissioner even when the statute establishing the office did not, as
in Humphrey’s Executor, attempt to limit the President’s removal
authority. The Court explained that “[w]hen Congress has for distribution among American claimants funds derived from foreign sources,
it may proceed in different ways. Congress may appropriate directly; it
may utilize the Executive; it may resort to the adjudicatory process.”75
Moreover, the “fact that it chose to establish a Commission to
‘adjudicate according to law’ the classes of claims defined in the statute
did not alter the intrinsic judicial character of the task.”76 Finally, “[i]f,
as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the
President from influencing the Commission in passing on a particular
claim, a fortiori must it be inferred that Congress did not wish to have
hung over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal.”77 The
President could not, therefore, remove a judicial official within the
executive branch from office absent cause. The Court would not lightly
impute to Congress an intent to countenance plenary removal authority
over judicial officials. The Court signaled that it would more readily
find in the statutory language a congressional intent to limit the
President’s removal of judicial as opposed to other executive branch
officials.
The Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison v. Olson78 arguably
has limited the President’s plenary removal authority further than in
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener. There, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Congress’s determination to shield the independent
counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 from the
executive’s plenary removal authority.79 Under the Act, the Attorney
General could remove the independent counsel only for cause. The
Court acknowledged that “[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the
amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General . . . exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged
criminal activity.”80 The question was not, as in Humphrey’s Executor
and Wiener, whether the official exercised quasi-judicial or quasilegislative power. Rather, in light of the congressionally imposed
limitation on the removal authority, the question was whether the
Executive retained “sufficient control over the independent counsel to
ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties.”81 In Morrison, the Court concluded that in light of the
75.

Id. at 355.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 356.

78.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

79.

Id. at 696–97.

80.

Id. at 695.

81.

Id. at 696.
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limited scope of the independent counsel’s duties and the limited
duration of the office, the Attorney General’s ability to remove the
counsel for cause was sufficient to accord with separation of powers
principles.
As applied to a judicial official, the formulation in Morrison likely
would yield the same result as in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener:
limiting the President or subordinate executive official’s power to
remove a judicial officer for cause would preserve in the executive
“sufficient control . . . to ensure that the President is able to perform
his constitutionally assigned duties.”82 The President would not have
any direct way to ensure that agency heads wisely fashion policy
through adjudication, but Morrison suggests that such restrictions are
permissible for enforcement officials as well. The Court will uphold
congressionally established for-cause limitations on the removal of
judicial officials. Thus, Congress can insulate (to a certain degree)
judicial officials within the executive branch from the President’s control.
The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board83 slightly revises the
constitutional terrain once again, but in a way reaffirming that
Congress can condition the removal of officials who solely engage in
adjudication. In the context of an agency (the PCAOB) subject to
oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court held
that two layers of insulation from the President’s removal authority left
the President with too little constitutional control over the exercise of
delegated authority. Because of the two layers of insulation, “the
President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own
responsibilities.”84
As with other agencies, the PCAOB exercised a mixture of
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative duties. But the Court was
clear that its two-layer rule will not apply to purely adjudicative
officials such as ALJs.85 Although there are many judicial officials
within the executive branch whose supervisors are subject to plenary
removal, Congress in its discretion can limit the removal of judicial
officials even when the supervisors of such judicial officials can only be
removed for cause. In other words, Congress can insulate judicial
officials by inserting two layers of cause protecting them from
discharge.86
82.

Id.

83.

561 U.S. 477 (2010).

84.

Id. at 514.

85.

Id. at 507 n.10.

86.

Nonetheless, there has been a recent spate of challenges to SEC adjudication on the ground that the “for cause” protection for ALJs is incompatible with the PCAOB decision. See Peter J. Henning, SEC Faces
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The Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund expanded the President’s power under Article II with respect to other executive branch
officials, reflecting an accountability version of Article II authority—
the President must have the tools to ensure superintendence over law
execution. As the Court stated, “[by] granting the Board executive
power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the
President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as
well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”87 But the
Court did not hold that the concern for Article II accountability extended to officials exercising solely adjudicative functions, presumably
because the public does not “pass judgment” on presidential supervision
of judging to the same extent as regulation and law enforcement. Thus,
even after Free Enterprise Fund, Congress can limit the removal of
adjudicative officials within the executive branch to “cause.”
In the absence of a for-cause limitation, however, it is not as clear
whether courts will impute to Congress an intent to shield the official
from at-will removal as it did in Wiener. For instance, in Kalaris v.
Donovan,88 decided after Wiener but before Morrison, the Secretary of
Labor attempted to remove two members of the Benefits Review Board
without specifying the reasons for removal. The hearing officers argued,
and the district court agreed, that Congress—as in the War Claims
Commission context—would not have wished to give the Secretary of
Labor plenary removal authority over hearing officers exercising the
“‘quasi-judicial’ function of adjudicating ‘private rights.’”89 Plenary
removal, from that perspective, was incompatible with judicial
independence.
The D.C. Circuit Court disagreed, finding that Congress could well
have envisioned close managerial control over judicial officials and that,
in the absence of congressional direction setting forth terms of office,
Presidents could exercise a plenary removal authority. The court
acknowledged that the Board was “performing a ‘quasi-judicial’
function” but noted that “this general characterization does little to
distinguish the Board, constitutionally, from the scores of administrative boards and tribunals in the Executive Branch that currently
adjudicate claims to federal statutory rights.”90 Indeed, the court noted
“there are suggestions in the history of the Act and its subsequent
administration that Congress affirmatively intended for Board
members, as part of the Department of Labor’s staff, to serve as other
Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some of Its Court Proceedings,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2015.
87.

Id. at 498.

88.

697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

89.

Id. at 393.

90.

Id. at 400.
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appointed officials serve—at the discretion of the Secretary.”91 Viewed
another way, individuals enjoy no Due Process right to an adjudicator
insulated from plenary removal, even when the entity possessing the
limited removal authority has an interest in the results of the
adjudication. Congress can limit the removal authority over judicial
officials within the executive branch; moreover, in the absence of any
specific congressional restriction, courts must divine from the context
whether an intent to shield the official should be imputed to Congress.
Affording Congress more leeway to insulate adjudicative, as
opposed to regulatory and enforcement, officials conforms to intuition.
If Congress wishes to shield judicial officials from presidential appointment, it likely can do so except in the case of principal officers, and if
Congress wishes to condition the executive’s power to remove all such
officials within the executive branch, it would likely be successful as
well. Such limitations would accord with the rule in Morrison v. Olson
that all such arrangements must leave the executive branch with
control over the essential attributes of the executive power.
As a consequence, the President’s authority over the policymaking
arising from adjudication need not be as complete as over policymaking
by regulators or enforcement officials. In the Court’s view, the process
by which policymaking is reached makes a difference—judicial-type
process can be shielded from executive control more completely than
when other means of fashioning policy are provided, even though the
policy emerging from both may be similar.92 Perhaps in the public eye,
there is less reason to link adjudication to presidential authority than
to forge a link between officials who make and enforce rules.
Humphrey’s Executor, Wiener, Free Enterprise Fund, and the like all
acknowledged the distinctive case for insulating adjudicative officials
from close presidential control, even though the Court itself has
recognized that adjudicators shape policy while engaging in
factfinding.93

91.

Id. at 390.

92.

Congress, of course, can choose to resolve claims on its own. Although
Justice Powell sought to gird invalidation of the one-house veto in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), on Due Process
grounds, his colleagues on the Court did not follow his lead. And, there is
no judicial review possible when Congress denies a petition for a stay of
deportation or for a monetary claim. The Supreme Court has held that it
is for Congress to determine the structure and fairness of adjudication of
public rights, whether in Congress or the executive branch. And
Congress’s control over adjudication is plenary if it chooses not to delegate
tasks to the executive branch, assuming that no Due Process issue arises.

93.

See supra text accompanying notes 67–85; see also Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1211–
14 (2013) (similarly charting the change in the Court’s jurisprudence).
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IV. Managerial Authority Over Adjudicative
Officials In The Executive Branch
Although others have noted that the President’s appointment and
removal authority over adjudicative officials within the executive
branch need not be as firm as over other officials,94 they have not
explored the corollary: In addition to the formal controls of appointment and removal is the President’s more intangible managerial
oversight over judicial officials also weaker?95 Accordingly, this section
first explores the President’s general managerial authority under Article
II and then concludes that Congress more readily can block executive
branch managerial efforts over judicial than over regulatory and
enforcement officials.
A.

Presidential Managerial Controls

Congressional delegation to specific executive branch officials has
not precluded Presidents from exercising managerial oversight in
addition to the controls of appointment and removal. Without such
oversight, there would be little coordination among agencies, resulting
in duplication and waste.96 Article II, in other words, has been read to
vest in the President power to take steps to manage the authority
delegated by Congress to the executive branch. Presidents have
established task forces cutting across agencies to permit joint efforts in
combatting poverty or illegal immigration. They have created platforms
to facilitate cross-agency discussion of issues of common concern and
have also set up mechanisms to resolve disputes among agencies.97 In
National Mining Association v. McCarthy,98 the D.C. Circuit recently
stated that “[u]nder Article II of the Constitution, departments and
agencies in the Executive Branch are subordinate to one President and
may consult and coordinate to implement the laws passed by

94.

E.g., Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence after PCAOB, 32 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2391, 2391–93 (2011); Vermeule, supra note 93; Barnett, supra
note 59.

95.

These controls undoubtedly have increased over time. Congress in the
early years at times delegated authority to subordinate officials with such
specificity that little oversight was contemplated. See Frank J.
Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the
United States 136–37 (1905).

96.

Cf. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1196–1209 (2012) (arguing
that the executive branch should help coordinate agencies to solve challenges such as overlapping and fragmented delegations).

97.

For the role of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice,
see Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979).

98.

758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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Congress.”99 Indeed, the court continued that “[i]n a ‘single Executive
Branch headed by one President,’ we do not lightly impose a rule ‘that
would deter one executive agency from consulting another about
matters of shared concern.’”100
Moreover, Presidents have asserted greater managerial authority
by requiring, in executive orders and less formal directives, that
agencies follow particular policies, whether on contracting out goods
and services101 or banning smoking in the workplace.102 These directives
can fashion significant policy that could not otherwise be pursued. For
several notable examples, President Truman used executive orders to
spark the government’s fight against segregation by ordering that the
military be desegregated.103 The second President Bush created the
Department of Homeland Security.104 President Obama outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the federal workforce.105
Indeed, President Obama’s recent initiative to defer deportation of
certain categories of illegal immigrants stemmed from a presidential
memo, not even an official executive order.106 Although the
appointment and removal authorities should not be ignored, Presidents
manage the executive branch routinely through other means. In the
absence of congressional direction to the contrary, Presidents can
fashion policy to guide the way in which the executive branch fulfills
the mission set by Congress.107

99.

Id. at 249.

100. Id. (quoting Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos
Varios v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 638 F.3d 794, 803 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
101. Memorandum from Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Establishments (May 29,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf.
102. Exec. Order No. 13,058, 41 C.F.R. § 74.315 (2013).
103. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1949).
104. Editorial, Mr. Ridge Goes to Washington, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2001, at
A16.
105. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014).
106. See Conn Carroll, It Is Completely Irrelevant That President Obama
Never Signed an Executive Order on Immigration, Townhall.com (Dec.
11, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/conncarroll/2014/12/11/it-iscompletely-irrelevant-that-obama-never-signed-an-executive-order-onimmigration-n1930571.
107. For an example of an executive order struck down because of a conflict
with congressional policy, see Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d
1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For an example of an executive order struck
down for lack of presidential authority, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
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With administrative rulemaking as well, Presidents have exerted
control over rulemaking by requiring agencies to comply with Executive
Orders charting particular procedural steps before the agencies can
announce certain major rules. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan attempted to ensure that agencies engaged in ever more
stringent cost-benefit analysis before releasing rules.108 Although the
particular politics at stake was controversial, the constitutional basis
for such executive orders was not. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “[T]he
President’s power necessarily encompasses ‘general administrative
control of those executing the laws’ throughout the Executive Branch
of government. . . . His faithful execution of the laws enacted by the
Congress . . . frequently requires the President to provide guidance and
supervision to his subordinates.”109 Thus, even when Congress delegates
rulemaking or a quasi-legislative role to agencies, the President has a
critical role to play in superintending the rulemaking.110
The extent of the President’s bureaucratic controls over adjudicative officials is not as clear. Given that Congress may leave the
President less appointment and removal authority over judicial officers
than others within the executive branch, the President’s general
managerial authority over judicial officials arguably can be similarly
circumscribed. Indeed, in Myers v. United States the Court stated that
“there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive
officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after
hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the
President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control.”111
The President may not direct the conduct of subordinate judicial
officials to the same extent as in rulemaking and enforcement. Should
judicial officials, therefore, whether appointed by the President, heads
of departments, or courts of law, report up the chain of command just
108. President Ford through Executive Order No. 11,821 required all agencies
to prepare Economic Impact Statements to submit to the Council on
Wage and Price Stability. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1975).
President Carter sought to increase public participation in rulemaking
through Executive Order No. 12,044. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R.
152 (1978). Under Executive Order No. 12,291 and then 12,498, President
Reagan provided for centralized controls over all major agency
rulemakings. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order
No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986). Under the orders, each agency had to
ensure that the delineated benefits in all rules exceeded theirs costs.
Agencies prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis and submitted proposed
rules to OMB for its independent study and comment prior to publication.
Presidents since have continued centralization of rulemaking.
109. Building & Construction Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d
28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
110. For an argument that presidential supervision over enforcement has been
surprisingly less comprehensive, see Kate Andrias, The President’s
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013).
111. Id. at 135.
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like most enforcement and regulatory officials? Alternatively, should
they be able to disregard directives if those directives interfere with
their exercise of judicial functions prescribed by Congress?
In the absence of specification from Congress, Presidents should be
able to manage judicial officers in the executive branch to the same
extent as those exercising regulatory and enforcement functions. In
addition to the power to appoint and remove from office, Presidents
can issue directives on what steps to take and what issues to consider
in resolving claims. In customs cases, for example, the executive branch
should be able to create procedures to govern the claims and even
clarify presumptions as to what amounts are due. At some point,
presidential meddling might violate the Due Process Clause if an
entitlement exists, but short of that possibility, Presidents can
structure the adjudications that Congress entrusts to them as they see
fit. Indeed, the history of pension and other claims resolved by the
executive branch within our nation’s first century of existence amply
demonstrates the discretion enjoyed by the President, absent Congress’s direction to the contrary. It is as if Congress directed the President personally to resolve the claims.
On the other hand, Congress routinely creates specific agencies to
adjudicate particular claims. The President presumably cannot switch
the NLRB’s adjudications to the Department of Labor. Congress can
also designate the particular officer, whether an ALJ or hearing
examiner, to resolve particular claims. Congress has determined whether particular claims can be subject to judicial review, and it has
directed when alternative dispute resolution as opposed to adjudication
should be utilized.112
At some point, congressional limitation of presidential authority
over adjudication within the executive branch violates the separation
of powers doctrine. As discussed before, Congress must leave sufficient
appointment and removal authority to allow the President some influence over the shape of the policymaking delegated to the executive
branch. One price of vesting judicial authority within executive control
is that the President cannot be divested of complete oversight. Congress
cannot replicate the Article III protection of tenure for judicial officers
in the NLRB or SEC. If Congress delegates sufficient authority to a
judicial official, that official can only be appointed in conformance with
the procedures in Article II.

112. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (2012); 39 U.S.C. § 1207 (2012). See generally U.S.
Office of Personnel Mgmt, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Handbook (explaining alternative dispute resolution and discussing
federal agency use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve workplace
disputes), available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/emp
loyee-relations/employee-rights-appeals/alternative-dispute-resolution/
handbook.pdf.
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Congress presumably could insulate agency officials who only
engage in factfinding more completely than for those who also have a
policy role. When adjudication essentially only includes factfinding,
there is commensurately less executive power at stake.113 Adjudication
of facts resembles more of a routinized function although, as discussed
previously, inferences in factfinding can shape the ultimate resolution
of the case. Even in such adjudicatory contexts, therefore, an executive
interest remains to ensure that the factfinding proceed in a way
consistent with the executive’s view of how best to implement the
congressional command, but Congress can leave less discretion in the
President’s hands than in the regulatory and enforcement contexts.
B.

Accommodating Congressional Design of Administrative
Adjudication with Executive Managerial Control

Few conflicts have been triggered by congressional efforts to shield
judicial officials in the executive branch from presidential management
efforts. Congress often has provided scant details when delegating
adjudicative authority to the executive branch. Thus, courts have not
had occasion to chart the boundaries between the executive’s interest
in superintending all policymakers and a congressional interest in
preventing executive meddling.
In this section, I first consider a recent example arising from a
Veterans Administration controversy in which Congress sought to
direct in detail how particular claims are to be adjudicated by the
executive branch. I then examine the extent to which Congress through
the APA more generally has sought to curb Article II managerial
authority over adjudicative officials in the executive branch. The APA
represents the principal means by which Congress has shaped
adjudication within the executive branch. The APA does not address a
myriad of details from scheduling status conferences to setting deadlines
for decisions, leaving the executive branch a large measure of
managerial authority. I conclude, however, that the APA’s grant of
decisional independence to ALJs, at a minimum, precludes the
executive branch from influencing the decisions before the fact and from
disciplining adjudicative officials for the substance of their decisions, no
matter how poorly reasoned.
1.

Veterans Access Act

In reviewing alarming reports of the delays and errors in processing
veterans’ claims at the Veterans Administration,114 Congress this past
113. Cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 539 (1838) (holding
that injunction against executive branch officer can lie to require
performance of “ministerial” duties).
114. See Veterans Admin. Office of Inspector Gen., Veterans Health
Admin. Interim Report: Review of Patient Wait Times,
Scheduling Practices, and Alleged Patient Deaths at the
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year evidently became concerned that the Merit Systems Protection
Board (“MSPB”), the agency previously delegated the authority to
review challenges to discipline, meted to certain high-level government
employees, would treat too lightly those responsible for the problems
plaguing the Veterans Administration. Accordingly, it somewhat
bizarrely altered the review process for Senior Executive Service
(“SES”) employees within the agency subject to discipline by
(1) requiring an Administrative Judge in the MSPB to hear any appeal
within twenty-one days or otherwise sustain the discipline; and
(2) precluding review by the MSPB as a whole.115 No review is provided
beyond the administrative level. Administrative Judges perform
comparable functions to the more familiar ALJs but outside the
protections of the APA.116
The new law thus changed administrative practice in two fundamental ways. First, Congress forced strict timelines on the agency,
requiring it to place any challenges from SES employees at the head of
the line. Given the general delay in processing challenges, the twentyone-day limit is unprecedented. The MSPB will have to prioritize the
SES cases if it is to provide a forum at all. Indeed, it must adopt an efiling system to permit such adjudication to go forward.117 Moreover,
the sanction is extraordinary—if the MSPB cannot hold the hearing
and decide on the merits immediately, the Veterans Administration
discipline will stand, depriving the employees of the opportunity to tell
their side of the story before a neutral arbiter.Second, the legislation
deprives the MSPB of policy oversight for the discipline. Congress, after
all, previously delegated to the agency the policy role of determining
when employee discipline should stand, not the Administrative Judges.
Congress seemingly bypassed the Presidential appointees in delegating
the unreviewed and unchecked adjudication to Administrative Judges
who, given the Landry precedent, likely should not be considered
officers of the United States subject to the Appointments Clause.
The MSPB itself questioned the constitutionality of Congress’s
action in a letter to the President.118 The MSPB stated in part that

Phoenix Health Care System (May 28, 2014), available at www.va.
gov.oig/VAIOG-14-02603-178pdf.
115. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-146, § 707, 128 Stat. 1754, 1798–99 (Aug. 7, 2014).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
117. Letter from Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman, U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board, to House and Senate Committees on Veterans’ Affairs
(Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.
aspx?docnumber=1075012&version=1079327&application=ACROBAT.
118. Letter from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board to President Barack
Obama (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.mspb.gov/net
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[w]e believe that Section 707 which, as noted above, prohibits
presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed officers of the executive branch from performing the responsibilities for which those
officers were appointed and confirmed to carry out, is on weak
constitutional footing. . . . Moreover, various courts have suggested that Congress is not permitted to infringe on the right of
the executive branch to enforce the laws . . . .119

The letter warned of a precedent under which Congress could “undermine—through must-pass legislation . . . —the ability of presidentiallyappointed, Article II Officers of the United States to carry out the
mission of the agency to which they were appointed to lead.”120
Yet the new Act is consistent with Congress’s ability to curb agency
management efforts. The twenty-one-day directive, even though it
forces the executive agency to reprioritize cases for decision and create
a new e-filing system, should pass constitutional muster.121 Congress
can design an adjudicative process for executive agencies to follow
without violating Article II, even when creating burdens on federal
agencies and making it more difficult for the President to oversee the
adjudicative process.
Moreover, the MSPB’s argument that Congress impermissibly has
circumvented Article II authority is no more compelling. The MSPB
need not be accorded a role in overseeing all discipline cases. The
desideratum of coordination is a policy call for Congress, not the
agency.122 To be sure, the Act vests the Administrative Judges as
opposed to the MSPB with final decisionmaking authority in the SES
cases, so that the Administrative Judges might now be considered
inferior officers. But, given that the Administrative Judges were
appointed by the MSPB members who are superior officers, no Appointments Clause issue should arise. Despite the MSPB letter, there is
no Article II infirmity in bypassing the MSPB for this select group of
claimants.

search/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1068653&version=1072950&applicati
on=ACROBAT.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. For the first MSPB decision complying with the new congressional
directive, see Talton v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. At-0707-0094-J-1
(Nov. 19, 2014) (sustaining VA discipline).
122. As long as Congress’s intent is clearly articulated, which it was in this
instance. See supra text accompanying notes 100.
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Nonetheless, the Due Process issues at stake are substantial. The
SES employees presumably enjoy a Due Process right in their continuing employment.123 The new statute affords a more prompt hearing after
the discipline is meted but, if the twenty-one-day limit so curtails the
type of hearing that the MSPB can afford, a Due Process challenge may
be appropriate.124 And if the MSPB cannot comply with the twentyone-day rule, then the discipline stands. The lack of opportunity to
contest the discipline in that situation cannot be squared with Due
Process principles.
2.

The APA

Congress has provided that much adjudication in the executive
branch be subject to the APA’s constraints.125 Congress through the
APA has determined that agency hearings are to be conducted before
an administrative judiciary that is protected to some extent from
agency interference. For instance, agencies that employ ALJs cannot
hire or fire them, except for cause, and that “cause” is to be determined
by a separate agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board as in the
Veterans Access Act context.126 Nor do the agencies set pay for ALJs,
and agencies cannot dock ALJs’ pay.127 Agencies cannot subject ALJs
to performance evaluations, for similar reasons.128 In addition, ex parte
discussions with outsiders are limited in order to prevent even the

123. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (providing
that government employment can be an entitlement subject to Due
Process protection).
124. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (delineating
balancing test to use to determine if sufficient process is afforded).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); see also Office of the Chairman of the Admin.
Conference of the U.S., Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission: Evaluating the Status and Placement of Adjudications in the Federal Sector Hearing Program 4–8 (Mar. 31,
2014), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf (providing on overview of the APA’s requirements for adjudication).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012). Although Congress can reduce pay for ALJs as a
group or eliminate their jobs altogether, Congress cannot readily pressure
any individual ALJ to reach a particular decision. The issues raised in
such hearings, in any event, are unlikely to be of such salience as to attract
the attention of members of Congress.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012).
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appearance of impropriety.129 As the Supreme Court described in Butz
v. Economou,130
[T]he process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as
to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent
judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the
parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could not exercise independent judgment because . . . they were often subordinate to executive officials within the agency.131

With respect to ALJ decisions under the APA, agency heads need
not pay any deference to the factfinding and legal pronouncements of
ALJs. In fact, the only check on agency displacement of ALJ factfinding
is that the ALJ’s factfinding remains in the record subject to judicial
review.132 With respect to managerial controls, the APA is silent, but
Congress provided that agencies may discipline ALJs for “good cause
established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board”
after a formal hearing.133 Discipline can stem from conduct in the
hallways of the agencies,134 at home,135 or from general
insubordination.136 Although the APA protections are far from complete, the Court’s construction of the appointment and removal authorities provides reason to protect any legislative specification of
independence. Congressional measures to shield adjudicative authority
from executive branch meddling should be interpreted broadly where
possible without fear of stepping on executive toes.
There currently is debate over whether ALJs under the APA should
be considered employees, as resolved in Landry, or rather inferior
129. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2012); see also Portland
Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th
Cir. 1993) (applying APA ban to other executive branch officials).
130. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
131. Id. at 513–14. For a discussion of what is meant by decisional independence, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice:
Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 434–36
(2007).
132. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (explaining
that Congress has allowed reviewing courts to set aside findings of fact
when there is insufficient evidence).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
134. E.g., SSA v. Carter, 35 M.S.P.R. 466, 469 (1985) (sexual harassment).
135. E.g., Long v. SSA, 635 F.3d 526, 537 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (alleged domestic
abuse).
136. E.g., Abrams v. SSA, 703 F.3d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (failure to follow
case processing order); SSA v. Manion, 19 M.S.P.R. 298, 299 (1984)
(refusal to hear cases).
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officers subject to the Appointments Clause. And, the status of ALJs
might turn on whether, by law, their decisions can fashion policy along
the typical common law path as opposed to just resolving whatever
factual issues are at stake. Congress has greater ability to insulate
employees as opposed to inferior officers from managerial oversight
given that they are not exercising significant influence over the
execution of the laws. Irrespective of the resolution of the open issue,
congressional direction that ALJs be independent does not violate the
President’s Article II authority.
Few court cases have arisen demarcating the line between the quasiindependence guaranteed by Congress and the agency’s managerial
efforts, but the importance of the line drawing can be seen in ALJs’
conflicts with the executive branch’s managerial initiatives, particularly
at the Social Security Administration (SSA). Several examples
illustrate the tension.
First, in response to evidence that ALJs were handling vastly
different workloads, the Social Security Administration instituted a
variety of reforms in the 1970s, including prohibiting ALJs from writing
their own opinions. SSA attempted to attain greater consistency among
ALJs hearing disability disputes. Some ALJs decided as many as 120
cases per month while others decided as few as ten.137 Setting a goal to
resolve a certain number of cases per month does, in a sense, interfere
with decisionmaking independence. ALJs cannot spend the time they
deem appropriate on any given case. Indeed, in SSA v. Goodman,138 the
Merit Systems Protection Board blocked an SSA effort to remove an
ALJ whose productivity, measured by the number of cases tried, lagged
behind the national median.139 Although the SSA had for years
encouraged and then warned the ALJ to increase productivity, the
MSPB was unmoved.140
In contrast, in Nash v. Bowen,141 an ALJ challenged a production
goal as antithetical to the ideal of decisionmaking independence.142 The
court of appeals, however, rejected the claim, reasoning that a
production goal “is not a prescription of how . . . an ALJ should decide

137. Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals
120–21 (1991).
138. 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984).
139. Id. at 330–31.
140. I have explored this tension before. Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall,
Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional
Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L.
Judges 1, 35–38 (2005).
141. 869 F.2d 675 (1989).
142. Id. at 676.
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a particular case.”143 Assuredly, an ALJ might argue that a directive to
decide more cases bleeds into the merits. For example, SSA ALJs might
spend less time writing decisions when granting claims against the
government because the agency has no right to appeal such grants, and
thus decisions granting benefits will not be scrutinized as much as those
denying benefits. In order to meet a production goal, therefore, the ALJ
might be tempted to favor claimants in a close case.144 But in the
absence of any such connection between the number of cases decided
and the merits of the case, a production goal does not seem problematic.
The tension has escalated in recent years as SSA has increased the
target number of cases that ALJs are to resolve each year to close to
six hundred. ALJs may feel beleaguered, and they do,145 but the
question remains whether Congress, in applying the APA to the ALJs,
would have wished ALJs to be free from such monitoring. Presumably
not. The connection between workload and decisional independence is
tenuous,146 and federal courts have workload goals of their own.147
Had SSA announced, instead, a measure to decrease the national
grant rate for disability claims, that measure would violate Congress’s
specification in the APA that ALJs be independent. A historical
example brings home the point. In response to Congress’s concern over
proliferation of Social Security disability claims in the late 1970s, SSA
announced in 1980 that its Appeals Council would review the decisions
of ALJs whose allowance rates of claims were significantly higher than
a national random sample, but not those that were lower. In addition,
the Council stated that it would focus on cases arising from hearing
offices that had high collective approval rates. The agency provided two
reasons for targeting ALJs whose allowance rates exceeded the national
median as opposed to those with allowance rates below the median.
First, given that claimants, not the agency, appeal adverse
determinations by the ALJs, review by the Appeals Council would
restore some balance to the process, ensuring that the agency did not
143. Id. at 680–81.
144. See Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater Consistency in Social Security Disability Adjudication: An Empirical Study and Suggested Reforms, ACUS Report 31 (2013), available
at
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achiev
ing_Greater_Consistency_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf
(noting
that ALJs under pressure “may have allowed more cases because allowances are easier to process than denials”).
145. Id. at 33 (discussing the effects of agency pressure on ALJs).
146. See, e.g., Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Colvin, No. 141953 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (brushing aside ALJ argument that workload
undermined independence).
147. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85
(1970) (addressing informal federal circuit measures addressing judges’
backlog of cases).
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ultimately have to pay more in benefits than Congress had intended.
Second, the Appeals Council had previously determined that it agreed
more with ALJs whose allowance rates fell beneath the national median
than those whose rates exceeded the median. As a result of the own
motion review, ALJs were put on notice that they would likely be
subject to review if their allowance rates exceeded the national median.
Indeed, an SSA memorandum warned that other steps would be taken
if ALJ allowance rates continued to be much higher than the national
median.
Targeting particular ALJs for review unquestionably can compromise decisional independence, and the SSA program likely was enacted
to that end. Directing all ALJs to adhere closer to the national
allowance rate resembles a curve familiar in most law school examinations. If Congress had determined that each ALJ was to allow a certain
percentage of claims—not an inconceivable notion148—then SSA’s own
motion review of wayward ALJs would be entirely consistent with the
congressional design. SSA oversight would ensure that ALJs not deviate
from a curve, much like law administrators attempt to rein in faculty.
Congress, however, directed each claim to be assessed on its merits.
The idea of a curve originated with the agency, not Congress. The
agency’s targeting of ALJs with high allowance rates149 cannot readily
be seen as an effort to promote uniform standards and therefore violated
the independence Congress prescribed in the APA.150
Nonetheless, SSA can target ALJs based on other factors without
violating the independence sought by Congress. It can target judges
who are outliers in the sense of both granting greater and fewer claims
than the median judge, and it can suggest, without mandating,
percentage ranges of grants for particular types of disability claims
based on national or regional averages.151 There also is nothing in the
APA preventing agencies from disciplining judges who are behind on
their dockets. At a minimum, the APA directs that agency management efforts cannot interfere directly with ALJs’ ability to reach whatever outcome they deem appropriate.

148. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 481, 512 (1990).
149. See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143
(D.D.C. 1984) (declaring that “unremitting focus on allowance rates”
violated the purpose of the APA).
150. See Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (E.D. Ark. 1999)
(refusing to dismiss first amendment claim by ALJ who alleged dismissal
based on impartial decision making).
151. See Krent & Morris, supra note 144, at 63–69 (proposing reforms to
the current framework).
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Whether the agency can discipline ALJs for misapplying the law
after the fact is less clear. On the one hand, the executive branch’s
interest in removing an ALJ who applies the law incorrectly or, worse
yet, misstates agency policy is clear. Similarly, an agency likely would
wish to remove an ALJ who used intemperate language in a decision.
To many, the APA’s provisions protecting ALJs from removal except
for “cause” with the “cause” subject to review by the MSPB should
serve as sufficient protection for ALJs. And as mentioned previously,
the MSPB has disagreed with employer agencies as to the legality of
discipline in many decisions.152 On the other hand, upholding discipline
for the contents of a decision allows an agency to pressure ALJs to
reach particular results. The prospect of discipline might pressure ALJs
into changing their decisions and thereby undermine the decisional
independence that Congress intended through the APA.
Consider the MSPB decision in SSA v. Anyel.153 There, an ALJ
challenged agency discipline resulting from errors in decisionmaking.
The MSPB Administrative Law Judge (currently, an administrative
judge would preside over the case) assigned to hear the challenge ruled
that permitting discipline for inaccuracies in an opinion would chill
decisional independence.154 The MSPB reversed, reasoning that the
APA was “intended to ‘result in a greater assurance of justice at the
hands of administrative agencies,’” and that aim eclipsed the
subordinate goal of ensuring decisional independence.155 According to
the agency, ridding the agency of ALJs who commit errors is more
important than assuring the public of ALJ independence.
The goal of assuring public integrity, however noble, allows too
much rein to agency heads. There is no objective metric with which to
capture an “error,” whether flowing from statutory construction,
weighing competing facts, or simply sloppiness. The MSPB decision in
Anyel skips over the questions of what constitutes an error and what
magnitude of error compromises the integrity of the judicial process.
After all, ALJs156 and district court judges157 are reversed at a substantial clip. The APA’s decision not to permit performance ratings

152. See, e.g., SSA v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 (1984) (finding insufficient evidence to support the agency’s decision).
153. 58 M.S.P.R. 261 (1993).
154. Id. at 267.
155. Id. at 268 (quoting statement of Sen. Ferguson, APA Legislative History
at 337).
156. The remand rate for SSA ALJs, for instance, is close to 50 percent. Krent
& Morris, supra note 144, at 9.
157. See, e.g., Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in
the Eighth Circuit during 2008, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 51, 67–72 tbl.A
(2009) (providing reversal rate for each district court judge within the
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strongly suggests that no discipline should be meted even for what the
agency believes to be repeated errors in decisions.158 Review by the
agency is available, and the agency can target ALJs for greater review
as long as that review is fashioned in a way that does not lean to a
particular result. Any discipline must be exogenous to the ALJ’s
reasoning in the decision itself.
Management discipline of immigration judges highlights the danger
of meddling.159 During the prior administration, the Attorney General
delegated to the Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) the power to
[d]irect the conduct of all EOIR employees to ensure the efficient
disposition of all pending cases, including the power, in his
discretion, to set priorities or time frames for the resolution of
cases; to direct that the adjudication of certain cases be deferred;
to regulate the assignment of adjudicators to cases; and otherwise
to manage the docket.160

Indeed, in one case, a superior within the DOJ called the Chief Immigration Judge and convinced him to direct an immigration judge handling a controversial case to change his decision.161 Moreover, Attorney
General Ashcroft in 2002 proclaimed that each member of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the next level of review, “is a Department of
Justice attorney who is appointed by, and may be removed or
reassigned by, the Attorney General . . . as necessary to fulfill the
Department’s mission.”162 Judges who disagreed with the Attorney
General’s views on the propriety of asylum could be reassigned within
the Department.
Congress’s provision of decisional independence under the APA—
unlike in the immigration context—should be understood as a directive
to preclude not only interference in pending cases, but also discipline
arising from the substance of decisions, however poorly reasoned. This
Eighth Circuit, many who had significant reversal rates, though much less
than for SSA ALJs).
158. For a recent congressional report castigating ALJ errors in decision
making, see Misplaced Priorities: How the Social Security
Administration Sacrificed Quality for Quantity in the Disability Determination Process, H.R. Staff Report, Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform 13–31 (2014).
159. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
Cornell L. Rev. 369, 371–79 (2006) (discussing the increasing lessening
of “decisional independence” in immigration proceedings).
160. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(ii) (2014).
161. Legomsky, supra note 159, at 373.
162. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002).
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conclusion may seem counterintuitive, forcing agencies to retain ALJs
who misstate agency policy or who fail to analyze cases carefully. The
directive for decisional independence nonetheless places a buffer of
protection around ALJs at least with respect to the analysis in their
decisions. In establishing decisional independence, Congress presumably
would not have anticipated discipline based on good faith efforts to get
the decision right.
Indeed, the MSPB on occasions other than in Anyel has been more
sensitive to preserving decisional independence. In SSA v. Burris,163 the
agency disciplined an ALJ who had provided claimants with a copy of
warnings he had received from SSA due to his belief that the agency
was not affording claimants due process.164 The MSPB stated that “[t]he
ability of an administrative law judge to write decisions free from
improper agency pressure is at the very core of an administrative law
judge’s decisional independence” and that the managerial orders to the
ALJ prohibiting him from sharing information with claimants intruded
on his “decisional independence.”165 The buffer zone created by the
APA’s decisional independence is critical to preserving the allocation of
power between Congress and the President in superintending
adjudicative systems delegated by Congress.
For another example, consider the SSA’s rule providing that “[t]he
ALJ must not use the decision as a forum for criticizing other
government components, the courts, the representative or the claimant.”166 There is no question that such a rule seeks to uphold the integrity and respect for the adjudicative process. Although the rule is even
handed, if the criticism is fundamental to explaining the decision, the
SSA rule may blunt the independence envisioned by Congress. The
issue arose in an arbitration questioning the legitimacy of discipline of
an SSA ALJ for commenting in decisions that he had been instructed
to make decisions after 900 days based on whatever was in the record,
no matter if incomplete. If the 900-day policy indeed were in place,
which was contested, then inclusion of that information in the decision
to explain why other possibly relevant information was not included in
the record would have been appropriate, despite the agency rule
forbidding criticism.167 In a close case, courts and the MSPB should
163. 39 M.S.P.R. 51 (1988).
164. Id. at 60–61.
165. Id. at 61; see also SSA v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57, 77 (1984) (declining to
discipline ALJ for comment in decision critiquing SSA’s ability to
generate an adequate record).
166. Social Secutiry Administration, Hearing, Administration, and
Litigation Law Manual I-2-8-25 (2005), available at http://www.ssa.
gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-8-25.html.
167. In re SSA and Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, 4, 5 (2011) (determining that
decision to discipline ALJ Steven H. Templin was proper and not in
violation of collective bargaining agreement between ALJs and SSA).
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uphold the congressionally directed decisional independence at the
expense of the managerial directives when the contents of the decisions
are implicated.
To be sure, agency managers would not want to give ALJs free rein
to air grievances in decisions, but the MSPB or arbitrator must
determine if the material in the decision is germane to the claim for
disability. Agencies can still proceed against ALJs under a theory of
insubordination if criticism in the decision is gratuitous and, of course,
if the ALJ’s anger is manifested in other ways, discipline would be
appropriate.
This is not to suggest that the APA captures the balance between
decisional independence and the executive’s need to manage judging
optimally. One simple change would be for Congress to prescribe fiveor ten-year terms in office for ALJs and provide that such terms be
presumptively renewable. If an agency is convinced that an ALJ has
erred consistently, it need not reappoint him or her to another term.
Currently, even without any revision, ALJs who err should not be
immune from retraining.168 Agencies in extreme cases can withhold new
cases from the ALJs.
If the APA does not apply, the executive branch can and has
exerted closer control. In such contexts, the Due Process Clause stands
as a critical check, but not all adjudicative schemes, such as the asylum
claims, include an entitlement.169 In contrast to ALJs, the executive
branch can provide for performance appraisals and assess the quality of
non-APA officials’ judging.
Finally, the salience of the APA’s provision for decisional independence provides justification for the otherwise questionable statutory
construction analysis in Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered
Species Committee.170 There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
APA provision forbidding ex parte contacts between an ALJ and “a
person or party on a fact in issue”171 applied to the President and White
House staff. The President argued that interpreting the APA to include
White House staff within “person or party” would undermine his ability
to control subordinates under Article II.172 Given that the Supreme
Court the year before held that the President could not be considered

168. Cf. Stephens v. MSPB, 986 F.2d 493, 495–98 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (dismissing
an ALJ’s appeal of a decision to require him to attend additional training).
169. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(v) (2014). This is not to suggest that Attorney
Generals have exercised this managerial authority wisely. See, e.g.,
Legomsky, supra note 159, at 371–79 (criticizing the Attorney General’s
managerial efforts in an asylum adjudication context).
170. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
172. Portland Audubon, 584 F.2d at 1546.
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an agency subject to the APA,173 the executive branch’s statutory
construction argument was plausible. Nonetheless, permitting ex parte
contacts with White House staff unquestionably would blunt Congress’s
intent in the APA to preserve decisional independence. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision, therefore, can be seen to implement the APA’s goal
of decisional independence.174

Conclusion
In short, Congress has the power to limit the executive branch’s
managerial authority over judicial officials more than they do over those
officials engaged in enforcement and regulation. Congressional efforts
to direct the process by which claims are to be adjudicated, as in the
recent Veterans Administration example, eclipse the Article II interest
in managing the executive branch. Moreover, Congress’s principal effort
to shape adjudication in the executive branch—the APA—provides for
a limited decisional independence for ALJs, which must at a minimum
protect an ALJ’s ability to find facts without pressure from above.
Congress’s specification of decisional independence should be construed
to insulate ALJs from discipline for their analysis of the rules and facts
at issue.

173. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
174. See Vermeule, supra note 93, at 1222–23 (defending the ruling on grounds
of “convention” as opposed to the intent expressed by Congress overall in
the APA).
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